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Abstract
We provide an explanation for the stylized fact that poor households are con-
centrated in the inner city of most U.S. metropolitan areas. We consider a metropoli-
tan area with an inner city surrounded by a suburb and two income classes. Using
numerical simulations, we show that two equilibria typically exist: one in which
the inner city has a majority of poor households and the other in which it has a
majority of rich households. We argue that the growth path selects the former
equilibrium because rich households jump to the suburb before poor households
spill into the suburb. In addition, the model provides an explanation for gentrifica-
tion: at large metropolitan populations, population growth causes rich households
in the city to live in areas previously inhabited by poor households.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: H73, R12, R14
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1.  INTRODUCTION
In most U.S. metropolitan areas poor households are concentrated in the inner city.  For
example, Glaeser et al. (2000) report “the well-documented fact that within U.S. metropolitan
areas, the poor generally live in the central cities and middle-income households generally live in
the suburbs.” At first glance this is somewhat surprising as the concentration of jobs in the inner
city and the higher cost of commuting time for rich households might be expected to lead rich
households to outbid poor households for the locations closer to the metropolitan center. This
paper uses the growth path of the metropolitan area to explain the paradox. In addition it
provides an explanation for gentrification in the inner city.
The “monocentric city” model of Alonso (1964)  Mills (1967) and Muth (1961, 1969)
adds land demand to the simple model of commuting cost in an early attempt to explain the
concentration of the rich in the suburbs (leaving the poor in the inner city). All jobs are
considered to be located at the metropolitan center. When deciding where to live, a household is
considered to trade-off commuting costs and land prices. If a household buys a house at a
location closer to the metropolitan center, it spends less time commuting and this advantage is
capitalized by a rise in the land price. Because rich households buy more land, the low price of
land in the suburbs pulls them towards the suburbs. Whether this is sufficient to overcome the
higher commuting cost depends on the magnitude of the two effects. If land demand is more
income elastic than commuting costs the lower land price in the suburbs dominates and rich
households are predicted to concentrate in the suburbs. Conversely, if land demand is less
income elastic than commuting cost, commuting considerations dominate and rich households
are predicted to concentrate in the inner city  (Wheaton (1977)). 
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Estimates of the income elasticity of land demand do not support the equilibrium with
rich households being concentrated in the suburbs. Wheaton (1977) estimates that the income
elasticity of land demand is statistically indistinguishable from the income elasticity of the
commuting cost, so that the Alonso-Mills-Muth model is unable to predict whether it is poor
households or rich households who live in the inner city. Glaeser, Kahn and Rappaport (2000)
find evidence that the income elasticity of land demand is significantly less than the income
elasticity of commuting, so that the monocentric city model predicts that it is the rich households
who live in the inner city. Empirically, therefore, this type of sorting on its own cannot be an
explanation for the centralization of the poor.
Tiebout’s (1956) model of fiscal decentralization stresses that public services are
important determinants of where households reside. A household shops over jurisdictions,
choosing the jurisdiction which provides his preferred public service level. Tiebout’s model is
normative as he seeks to establish the efficiency of the resulting equilibrium. However, many
authors (e.g., Elickson (1971), McGuire (1974),  Berglas (1976a, 1976b), Wooders (1978),
Yinger (1982) and Epple et al. (1984, 1993)) have extended the model to consider positive
outcomes. These authors show that, because households with different incomes have different
demands for the public service, they choose different jurisdictions, or there is sorting by income
between jurisdictions. Differences in public service levels are capitalized into land prices.1  
Tiebout’s model is non-spatial. Jurisdictions are viewed as areas of land in a featureless
plain so that there is no a-priori reason as to which jurisdiction or which piece of land is
inhabited by the poor households. If there are two jurisdictions, labeled the inner city and the
suburb, then there are two equilibria: one where the inner city contains the poor households, and
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another where the suburb contains the poor households. Tiebout’s model therefore suggests that
households do sort by income between jurisdictions but provides no prediction as to whether the
poor households congregate in the inner city or the suburb.
Our view of the topic (as discussed in de Bartolome and Ross (2003, 2004, 2007)) is that
commuting costs, land prices and public service levels are all important determinants as to where
households locate. In our model, a circular inner city has an exogenous boundary and is
surrounded by a suburb. Commuting considerations are present because all households must
commute to the central business district which is located at the center of the inner city. In
addition, households care about the public service provided by a jurisdiction and its level is
determined by voting. The model has two income-classes.  Rich households have higher
commuting costs per mile than poor households and, consistent with the data, land demand is
relatively income inelastic. Ceteris paribus, therefore, rich households outbid poor households
for land nearer the inner-city’s center.  In addition, rich households have a higher demand for the
public service so that ceteris paribus different income groups prefer to live in different
jurisdictions. In the spirit of the indeterminacy of Teibout’s model, we find two equilibria over a
range of metropolitan populations. In one equilibrium, it is the poor households who form the
majority in the inner city, voting low public services in that city; in the second equilibrium, it is
the rich households who form the majority in the inner city, voting high public services there.
What is unexplained in our earlier work is why the equilibrium with poor households forming
the majority in the inner city has been selected by most U.S. metropolitan areas. This is the topic
addressed by this paper.
To determine which equilibria is likely to be selected, we simulate the city’s growth by
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considering an increase in the metropolitan population in the presence of a fixed boundary
between the inner city and the suburb. Poor households are the majority in the metropolitan
population. When the population is small, the equilibrium has all households living in the inner
city; poor households, forming the majority, vote a low level of the public service. As the
population increases, the edge of urban development moves outwards towards the inner-city’s
boundary and city rents increase . While there is still some undeveloped land in the inner city,
some rich households "jump” to the suburb to form a new jurisdiction with a high public service. 
This establishes rich households as the majority in the suburb. Further growth in the
metropolitan population leaves this configuration in place: rich households congregate in the
suburb leaving poor households in the inner city.
Other authors have provided possible explanations as to why the poor are concentrated in
the inner cities. LeRoy and Sonstelie (1983) suggest that it may be a consequence of the
introduction of the automobile. In their model, car travel is faster than public transportation but
is  also more expensive - initially therefore cars were bought by rich households allowing them
to move out of the inner city. Glaeser et al. (2000) suggest that the reason lies in public
transportation. In their model, public transportation is favored by high population density and is
therefore located in the inner city. Poor households use public transportation to commute and
hence they locate in the inner city where the public transportation is. Brueckner and Rosenthal
(2006) suggest that the reason lies in the housing stock: richer households live in the suburbs
because they are attracted by the newer housing stock there. 
Although “the poor generally live in the cental cities and middle-income households
generally live in the suburbs” (op. cit.), sorting is incomplete. As is well-known, inner cities
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contain many middle-income households and the suburbs contain many poor households. In our
earlier papers we showed how capitalization supports an equilibrium in which both income
classes live in both jurisdictions (“income-mixing”). In this paper we show that, in this
equilibrium configuration, population growth causes the boundary between the rich and poor
households in the inner city to move outwards so that areas which were previously inhabited by
poor households become inhabited by rich households - a process which is descriptively similar
to the “gentrification” observed in many U.S. cities since the 1990s.
The purposes of this paper are essentially positive. We therefore want a model which is
simple enough to show the underlying forces and yet rich enough to capture the important
institutional details.2 Our main simulation has local government financing itself using both a
property tax levied on homes and a residence tax, where the latter is used to represent non-
residential sources of revenue (viz. the property tax levied on business, the sales tax and
intergovernmental grants).   However, our main focus is on establishing the growth path of the
metropolitan area in the presence of commuting forces, land demand and public service
differences and the property tax - by shifting the tax burden from poor households to rich
households - affects the incentives of households when choosing where to locate. Therefore, to
establish that our results are not due to the property tax per se, we rerun the simulations with the
residence tax being the only source of local revenue.  The movement of rich households to the
suburb is maintained. 
Because we are comparing different equilibria, it is difficult to use a calculus-based
methodology. We therefore use a computable general equilibrium model. We also use a very
simple utility function so that the intuition is highlighted. The paper is structured as follows:
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Sections 2 and 3 present the theoretical model; Section 4 presents the simulation structure;
Section 5 discusses the calculated equilibria, the selection of the equilibrium and gentrification;
and Section 6 concludes. 
2.  THE MODEL
2.1 Spatial overview
Figure 1: the metropolitan area
  The spatial layout of the metropolitan area is illustrated by Figure 1.  At the center of
the metropolitan area is the business district to which all households must commute; for ease of
presentation the business district is assumed to be a point with no area. The business district is
surrounded by a circular central city, henceforth denoted as “the city”and labeled C. The city has
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an exogenous jurisdictional boundary of radius B. In the city there may be undeveloped land, so
that the limit of development has radius X: 
X < B: there is undeveloped land at the edge of the city;
X = B: there is no undeveloped land in the city.
The city is surrounded by a suburb, labeled S.  The outer jurisdictional boundary of the suburb is
sufficiently distant that all households live in the city or in the suburb; the outer limit of
development in the suburb is a circle of radius Y. Our interest is in how households of differing
incomes distribute themselves across the metropolitan area as the metropolitan population grows.
2.2 Basic Analytic Structure
An household lives in a jurisdiction j ( ) and obtains utility from consuming c
units of a privately-provided numeraire good, from consuming l units of land, from consuming h
units of housing capital and from gj units of a public service provided by the jurisdiction. For
ease of calculation, we consider a utility function which is linear in the numeraire and additively
separable in its arguments:
,
where u(.), v(.) and w(.) are strictly concave functions. Because we want the demand for land,
housing capital and the public service to appear normal or to be more valued by households of
higher income, we set  and  to be functions of the endowed income of the household , M :
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In this description, households differ in their tastes for land, housing capital and the public
service, and their tastes vary systematically with endowed income.3 
Each household has a fixed time endowment which he can use either for working or for
commuting to the metropolitan center. His endowed income M is his income if he spends no time
commuting or if he lives at the metropolitan center. If he lives at distance z from the
metropolitan center,  his income is reduced by the opportunity cost of the commute. The time
spent commuting is proportional to z and the opportunity cost of a unit of his time is proportional
to M, so that in this case his commuting cost is kM z (where k is a constant). There is the
possibility of a lump-sum transfer T  to all households. Hence his income available to buy the
numeraire good, to buy land and housing capital and to pay taxes is M - kMz + T. 
The jurisdiction provides the public service g j . The production of the public service
shows constant returns to jurisdiction size, and the cost of providing a unit of the public service
to a resident is s (units of numeraire per resident)4 . Most U.S. local governments finance public
services using a property tax levied on homes, a property tax levied on businesses, a sales tax
and intergovernmental grants. To model this “mixed” revenue structure by each jurisdiction
financing a fraction λ of its cost of the public service using a property tax on land and housing
capital levied at tax rate ,  and financing the remaining fraction  using a residence tax. In
our main simulation we consider  to be a good approximation to current U.S. practice.
However, our focus is on sorting between jurisdictions based on differences in commuting cost,
land demand and public services,  and the use of the property tax introduces additional incentives
(relative to the residence tax). First: rich households spend more on their homes than poor
households so that, in jurisdictions in which both income classes reside, rich households pay a
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greater tax share or there is an implicit transfer from rich to poor households. This makes such
jurisdictions less attractive to rich households and more attractive to poor households. Second: in
jurisdictions in which both income classes reside, the property tax lowers the tax-price of the
public service to poor households - leading them to vote a higher public service level if they are
the majority. This makes such jurisdictions more attractive to rich households. To show that our
results are driven by the difference in public service levels and not by the property tax per se, we
consider the case of the pure residence tax (λ = 0) after presenting the main simulations.
The price of a unit of land at distance z from the metropolitan center is r(z) and the price
of a unit of housing capital is p.  The consumption of the private good by the household if he
locates at distance z  from the metropolitan center is therefore
 ;
the utility of the household is
       
.
Budget balance by the jurisdiction requires that the tax rate is set as
.
There are two income classes. Poor households have income M1 and rich households
have income M2: M1 < M2 .
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2.3 Rents and sorting within a jurisdiction
At equilibrium, a household of income M achieves utility .  Denote the bid of a
household of income M for land at a location which is distance z from the metropolitan center
and lies in jurisdiction j as  :
Differentiating with respect to z within a jurisdiction, using the envelope condition, and
rearranging: 
 . (1)
The willingness-to-pay (per unit of land) of the household to move marginally closer to the
metropolitan center is the benefit of the decreased commuting cost per unit of land area
purchased.
Differentiating with respect to M and rearranging:
.
The bid-rent curve steepens (becomes more negative) with income if the income elasticity of
land demand is less than unity.5 Recent empirical estimates suggest that the income elasticity of
land demand is less than unity, and this case is henceforth assumed.
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ASSUMPTION: the income elasticity of land demand is less than unity:   .
The rent paid at any location is the highest bid-rent of all households at that location or
the rent schedule r(z) in the jurisdiction is the envelope of the bid-rent functions. A household
locates at the point where his bid-rent curve touches the envelope, or
. (2)
Figure 2: the rent schedule as the envelope of the bid-rent curves 
Figure 2 illustrates the creation of the rent schedule in a jurisdiction if both income
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classes reside there. It shows the bid-rent curves R(z ; j, M1) and R(z; j, M2), with the bid-rent
curve of the rich household being steeper than the bid-rent curve of the poor household.  The rent
schedule r(z) is the envelope of the bid-rent curves.6 Rich households are outbidding the poor
households for the locations closer to the metropolitan center because the benefit to them of the
saved commuting is greater. Households of income M2 locate on the inside of the jurisdiction and
households of income M1 locate on the outside of the jurisdiction, or income decreases as
distance from the metropolitan center increases. With both income classes living in the city
(suburb), the boundary between the income classes in the city (suburb) occurs at distance x (y)
from the metropolitan center.7 
The rent schedule in a jurisdiction must be continuous as otherwise a household who is
located adjacent to the discontinuity on the side of high rent could increase his utility by moving
across the discontinuity to the side of low rent: his rent would decrease by a discrete amount but
his commuting cost would increase only marginally.
These results are summarized in the Lemma:
LEMMA : Within a jurisdiction:
(a ) rent decreases as distance from the metropolitan center increases.
(b ) if both income classes reside in a jurisdiction, rich households live
                               on the inside and poor households live on the outside. 
(c ) the rent schedule is continuous.
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2.4 Sorting between jurisdictions
A household chooses to live in the jurisdiction in which he achieves the greatest utility. If
households of the same income live in both jurisdictions, they must achieve the same utility in
each jurisdiction: any commuting or fiscal gain the households achieve in one jurisdiction is
exactly balanced by the higher rent they have to pay.  If both jurisdictions are inhabited but no
households of income M live in one jurisdiction, then rents in that jurisdiction are such that a
household of income M cannot increase his utility by moving into that jurisdiction. If a
jurisdiction is uninhabited, the household calculates the utility he would achieve by moving into
the jurisdiction by assuming that the rent he would pay is the reservation rent of land (see below)
and that, by moving, he would become the majority so that the public service level he would
experience would be his desired public service level.8
2.5 Model closure
The public service in each jurisdiction is set by majority voting; households vote
myopically, taking the rent schedule and the jurisdictional population as given.9 
In our simulations, there is an equal number of poor and rich households.  This has the
advantage of ensuring that, if both jurisdictions are occupied, one has a majority of poor
households and one has a majority of rich households. The division of the population into two
income classes is of course artificial and, understanding that the U.S. income distribution is
skewed towards poor households, we assume that, in the case of tied voting (a situation which
arises when only the city is inhabited), the voted outcome is the outcome desired by poor
households. 
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The model is closed by assuming:10
1. The number of households in the metropolitan population, N, is exogenous. N is
considered to be a continuous variable.
2. The reservation price of land is r0. The rent at the limit of development in the suburb
(Y) is therefore r0 . If the city contains undeveloped land (X < B), the rent at the limit
of development (X) is  r0. If all the city’s land is developed (X = B), the rent at the
city’s side of the jurisdictional boundary is at least r0. 
3. The average rent paid by all households is returned to households as the lump-sum
transfer T. 11 
3.  GROWTH: SUBURBANIZATION AND GENTRIFICATION
We now consider the growth of the metropolitan population in order to explain why poor
households tend to be concentrated in the city and gentrification. Our presumptions are:
(1) Equilibrium configurations. As the metropolitan area grows, the equilibrium
configuration at each point in time resembles a static equilibrium for the
contemporaneous population level.
(2) Continuity. As the metropolitan population grows from N to N + ΔN, the equilibrium
configuration changes from one static equilibrium to another static equilibrium. The
new static equilibrium at population N + ΔN  is one which can be reached from the
pre-existing equilibrium (associated with population N ) by marginal changes in the
limits of development X and Y and in the within-jurisdiction boundaries between the
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income classes x and y (if such an equilibrium exists).  Only if there is no such
“adjacent” equilibrium is there large-scale migration between the jurisdictions. 
Historical metropolitan populations were very small. All households lived in the city and
the city had undeveloped land (X < B) . We describe this equilibrium configuration as the “single
city”. Poor households are the “as if” majority and vote a low public service. If a rich household
moved to the suburb, he would benefit from being able to vote a high level of the public service
and the lower rent, but he is deterred from doing this by the high cost of commuting from the
suburb. 
Figure 3: equilibrium configuration of the “single city”
In the remainder of this paper,  we illustrate an equilibrium configuration by using its rent
schedule. Figure 3 illustrates the “single city” using its rent schedule. Our assumption that the
income elasticity of land demand is less than unity implies that the rent gradient is steeper in the
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region inhabited by rich households.  Therefore, in interpreting the figures, we can use the slope
of the rent schedule to infer the income of a household living at a location: a flat (steep) rent
schedule implies that poor (rich) households live at that location.12 For example, interpreting
Figure 3: moving in from the jurisdictional boundary, initially there is an undeveloped region; at
the limit of development (X) the rent is the reservation value  ; then the rent schedule is
relatively flat indicating that these locations are inhabited by poor households; at the class
boundary x the rent schedule steepens indicating that the locations, which are closer to the
metropolitan center than x, are inhabited by rich households.
As the metropolitan population grew, the limit of development in the city moved
outwards and eventually such growth led to the development of a suburb.  One income class
became the majority in the suburb, leaving the other income class to become the majority in the
city. Presumption (2) implies that whichever income class became first established in the suburb
retained its majority in the suburb, leaving the other income class to retain its majority in the
city.13 Thus, to predict which equilibrium configuration is selected - with poor or rich households
forming the majority in the city - we need to determine which income class enters the suburb
first. This is the “race to the suburb” referred to in the title of this paper. There are two scenarios:
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                                    Figure 3: the rich “jump” over undeveloped land to the suburb
1. Rich households enter the suburb first by “jumping” over undeveloped land. Starting
from the configuration of the “single city”, as the population grows rents rise at the
center. At a critical population and while there is still undeveloped land in the city,  a
rich household may find it beneficial to move to the suburb. In the suburb, he would
vote his desired public service level and pay a lower rent. Although he incurs a higher
commuting cost, he will benefit overall if he is sufficiently sensitive to the public
service level.  The property tax provides an additional benefit because, by moving to
the suburb, he avoids paying the implicit transfer to the poor.  The metropolitan
growth in this scenario is illustrated in Figure 3: the solid line shows the equilibrium
configuration at the pre-existing metropolitan population and the dashed lines show
the new  equilibrium configuration which has some rich households inhabiting the
suburb.  With rich households leaving the city, poor households are left in control of
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the city. We term this scenario “jumping” over undeveloped city land.14 
       
(a) (b)
Figure 4: poor households “spill” into the suburb
2.  Poor households enter the suburb first by “spilling” from the city. Unlike rich
households,  poor households have no incentive to set up a suburban jurisdiction
while the “single city” still has undeveloped land.  To see this, consider a “single
city” represented by the solid line in Figure 4(a) and consider a poor household at the
edge of development in the city. If he were to move to the suburb, he would pay the
same rent, the public service would still be his desired level but he would incur a
higher commuting cost. The property tax provides an additional cost because, by
moving to the suburb, he would pay higher taxes (the implicit transfer from the rich is
forfeited). Therefore in this scenario poor households can enter the suburb first only
by “spilling over” into the suburb when the limit of city development moves across
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the jurisdictional boundary. The dashed line in Figure 4(a) illustrates the new
instantaneous configuration which now has some poor households inhabiting the
suburb. 
In this scenario, as poor households “spill” into the suburb, rich households become
the city’s majority and they vote a high public service level.15  The high public
service level makes the city less attractive to poor households and some additional
poor households leave the city for the suburb, recreating undeveloped land in the city.
This would cause a discontinuous change in x, X and Y. If the poor maintained its
majority in the suburb, the equilibrium configuration would resemble that illustrated
in Figure 4(b). However, if there are several possible equilibria, continuity alone is
unable to predict which equilibrium is chosen.16
The critical distinction between the two scenarios is whether the rich become established in the
suburb while there is still undeveloped land in the city. To establish which scenario is realized,
we simulate the metropolitan area at different population levels.  
In addition to providing an explanation as to why poor households concentrate in the city,
our simulation also provides an explanation for gentrification. Gentrification occurs in the city if,
as the metropolitan population increases, rich households start residing in areas previously
inhabited by poor households.
4. SIMULATION FRAMEWORK
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The analysis of this paper is to simulate the equilibrium structure of a metropolitan area
as its population grows.  The utility function of a household with endowed income M is specified
as:
where AA, BB and CC are constants. We chose this functional form - with separability, with a
linear dependence on the consumption of the numeraire and with a logarithmic dependence on
land and housing capital -  for computational tractability.17 We chose the parameter values of α,
β, γ, φ,  AA, BB and CC to match elasticities and income shares as:18
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Table 1: Assumed elasticities and expenditure shares
income
elasticity
price
elasticity
expenditure
shares
Land    .4 a -1 b .03 c
Housing capital 1.2 d -1e .15 f
Public service 0.7 g -0.5 h .09 i
a   Muth (1971) estimates the income elasticity of demand for land as:
0.328. 
Straszheim (1975) estimates income elasticity of lot size as: 0.345. Cheshire
and Sheppard (1998) use U.K. data and estimate income elasticity of land
area to be in range: 1.678 - 3.755 . Glaeser et al (2000) estimate income
elasticity of land demand as being in range:  0.1 - 0.4. We use the upper-
value of the Glaeser et al. estimate.
b The logarithmic dependence of utility on land implies a price elasticity of:
-1. This is within the range determined by studies, viz. Muth (1971)
estimates the price elasticity of demand for land as: -0.512.  Straszheim
(1975) estimates price elasticity of lot size as:  - 1.072.
King (1976) estimates price elasticity for “site characteristics” (which
include land) as: -0.82. Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) use U.K. data and
estimate price elasticity of land area to be between  -0.804 and -1.533 
Gyourko and Voith (2001) use suburban Philadelphian data to estimate the 
price elasticity as: -1.64.  
c From National Income and Product Accounts 2000, Table 2.1: the
Compensation of Employees is 5783 ($b). From Table 2.5.5:  housing
expenditures (including imputed rent) is 1006 ($b). We consider this to be
“total housing” comprised of housing capital plus land. Therefore
expenditure on housing capital plus land as share of “income” is .17.
To determine land value as a share of house value: Muth (1971) estimates
that land expenditure as fraction of house price is: 0.18. Gyourko and Voith
(2001) find that for the Philadelphia suburbs land as a share of house value
is: 0.15. We accept this value.
Therefore land expenditure as a share of income is: 0.15 x 0.17 = 0.03.
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Similarly, housing capital as a share of income is: 0.85 x 0.17 = 0.15.
d  Muth (1971) estimates the income elasticity of housing capital as: 0.778.
McMillan (1979) estimates the income elasticity of internal space as: 1.20.
Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) use U.K. data and estimate income elasticity
of internal space to be in range: 1.592 - 1.751. We use McMillan’s estimate
as it lies between the other two. 
e  The logarithmic dependence of utility on housing capital implies a price
elasticity of: -1. This is within the range determined by studies, viz. Muth
(1971) estimates the price elasticity of demand for housing capital as: 
- 1.0388. Straszheim (1975) estimates price elasticity of rooms as: -0.078.
King (1976) estimates price elasticity for interior space as -.14 . McMillan
(1979) estimates the price elasticity for interior space as: -3.47.
Cheshire and Sheppard (1998) use U.K. data and estimate price elasticity of
internal space to be in range between -0.515 and -1.216.
f See note c.
g Inman (1979) reviews the literature and finds most estimates for the
income elasticity of public spending lie in range: 0.2 - 0.7. More recent
community-based studies find income elasticities which exceed 1 e..g.
Schwab and Zampelli (1987) find the income elasticity for public safety to
be: 1.0-1.2 . Dynarski et al. (1989) find the income elasticity for education
to be: 3.65.  Duncombe (1991) finds the income elasticity for fire protection
to be: 1.3. In view of the higher estimates of recent studies, we take the
upper value of Inman’s range.
h   Inman (1979) reviews the literature and finds most estimates for the price
elasticity of public spending lie in the range between -0.1 and -0.5. We use
the upper (absolute) value of Inman’s range.
i From National Income and Product Accounts 2000, Table 2.1: the
Compensation of Employees is 5783 ($b). From Table 3.21: Current Tax
Receipts of Local Government is 353 ($b). Therefore local tax receipts as
share of “income” is: 0.06.  But local government also receives financing
from state and federal government, so that its expenditure (from Table 3.21)
is 715 ($b), and local expenditure as share of “income” is: 0.12. We use the
mid value: 0.09.
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These values imply parameter values as:
α = .4;  β = 1.2;  γ = 1.4; , φ = 1; AA = 20, BB = .017 and CC = .003.
We use stylized data (suitably rounded) to set the other parameter values of the model as:
Table 2: simulation parameters
Parameter description Parameter name Parameter value
Fraction of households
who are poor
.5
City’s jurisdictional
boundary (miles)1
B 8
Income of poor households
($ per year) 2
25 000
Income of rich households
($ per year) 2
75 000
Commute time per mile as
fraction of work day 3
k 0.0125
Reservation price of land
($ per acre per year) 4
r0 2 000
Price of housing capital 
($ per unit) 5
p 2 000
Price of public service 
($ per unit) 5
p 2 000
Fraction of government
expenditure financed by
the property tax 6
.4
Fraction of land area used
for housing 7
.4
1    From Census of Population and Housing 2000, Population and Housing
Unit Counts, Table 34: the average inner city area of all CMSA/MSAs with
over 1 million residents is 196 (sq. miles). Considering each inner city to be
a circle,   or B=7.9 (miles).
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2   From Money Income in the United States 2000, Table A.1: the 25th
percentile household income is inferred to be 22 000 ($) and the 75th
percentile household income is inferred to be 73 000 ($).
3    Based on round-trip speed of 20 mph and 8 hour working day.
4   Glaeser, Gyourko and Saks (2005) report a range of land prices in 21
metropolitan areas of $2000 0.13-4.1 ($ per sq. ft) or $2000 5663-178598 ($ per
acre); using an annual interest rate of .04, this translates into the rental cost
of land being between 226 and 7144 ($ per acre). This range is for the land
price over a whole metropolitan area and we therefore use a value in the
lower part of the range as the value for undeveloped land at the
metropolitan boundary.
Gyourko and Voith (2001) show that between 1972-1997 land prices in a
developed Philadelphia suburb averaged around 0.9 $1990/sq ft or 51652 $2000
per acre. Using an interest rate of 0.04, this translates into the rental cost of
land being 2066 $2000 per acre. 
5   This value is normalized to equal the reservation price of land.
6   From Census of Governments 1992 Volume 2 Number 1, Table 4: the gross
assessed value of residential properties were 2 511 599 ($m) and the gross
assessed value of commercial/industrial properties were 997 462 ($m). 1986
was the last census which reported these values.  If this division of taxable
property was maintained in 2000 and if the tax rate on commercial/industrial
property tax rate is 1.757  times as high as the property tax rate on residential
property (Table 5, 50-State Property Tax Comparison Study, National
Taxpayers Conference, 2006), the fraction of the property tax paid by
residences is 2511599 /(2511599 + 997462(1.757)) = 0.589. 
From 2000 National Income and Product Accounts, Table 3.21: Property
Tax Revenue (246.8 ($b)) as fraction of Local Government Current Tax
Receipts (352.6 ($b)) = 0.7.
Hence residential property tax receipts as fraction of locally-raised revenue
= 0.589 x 0.7 = .41.
7   From Census of Population and Housing 2000, Table 34: the density of 
housing units in central cities is 1126.4 (housing units per sq. mile). From
American Housing Survey for the United States 2005, Table 1B-3: the median
lot size of 1-unit structures in central cities is 0.21 (acres). Treating the median
as the average, the area of housing units per square mile is 1126.4 x 0.21 / 640
= .37
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Note that, in a departure from our earlier work, we explicitly take account of the fact that only
40% of a city’s developed land area is devoted to housing with the remaining land being used for
businesses and infrastructure.
5.  EQUILIBRIA OF THE METROPOLITAN AREA
In this section we describe the static equilibria as the metropolitan population increases
but the city’s jurisdictional boundary B remains fixed. We focus on the case  because it
represents current “average” practice in the U.S;  in Section 5 we will consider the cases of 
and . There are many potential equilibrium configurations corresponding to which income
class forms the majority in the city and whether the city includes one or both income classes,
which income class forms the majority in the suburb and whether the suburb includes one or
both income classes, and whether there is undeveloped land in the city.19 Instead of discussing all
the possible equilibrium configurations, we present below only the equilibria actually found in
our simulations.
5.1 Very small metropolitan populations: the single city
The boundaries and populations of equilibria with the “single city” configuration are
shown in Table 3. Rents, public service levels, tax rates and average lot sizes are shown in Table
6 in Appendix A.
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x 
(miles)
Limit
 of city
development
X 
(miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y 
(miles)
Limit 
of suburb
development
Y 
(miles)
Number 
of rich
households
in city
 
Number 
of poor
households
in city
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
 
Number 
of poor
households
in suburb
7000 single city 1.47 2.04 3 500 3 500
10 000 single city 1.69 2.38 5 000 5 000
20 000 single city 2.18 3.18 10 000 10 000
40 000 single city 2.73 4.19 20 000 20 000
80 000 single city 3.30 5.42 40 000 40 000
Table 3: equilibria with the “single city” configuration and 
Table 3 shows that, as the metropolitan population increases,  x and X move outwards; from
Table 6 rents increase and average plot sizes fall.20
As rents rise in the city, the suburb becomes increasingly attractive to rich households. At
a metropolitan population slightly larger than N = 80 000 (actually at N = 80 016), rich
households can achieve the same utility in the suburb as in the city: as discussed in Section 3, by
moving to the suburb, a rich household can vote a higher public service level, pay a lower rent
and avoid paying the transfer to poor households which is implicit in the property tax. If the
population increases further, the suburb becomes inhabited with some rich households and the
“single city” ceases to be an equilibrium configuration. This occurs while there is still
undeveloped land (X < B).  Although we will look at the different equilibrium configurations,
this establishes our main result: while there is still undeveloped city land, rich households
“jump” to the suburb, establishing themselves as the majority there. This leaves poor households
as the majority in the city - an equilibrium configuration which is maintained as the metropolitan
area continues to grow.
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5.2   Equilibria with both jurisdictions occupied: the city having a majority of poor households
  
              Configuration A                       Configuration B                     Configuration C
Figure 5: Equilibrium configurations with city having majority of poor households
Above a critical population both jurisdictions are inhabited. We first consider the
equilibrium configurations in which the city’s majority is poor. We describe these equilibria in
considerable detail because, as noted in the Introduction, poor households tend to concentrate in
the cities of most U.S. metropolitan areas. The equilibria are illustrated in Figure 5 and their
boundaries and populations are shown in Table 4 below. Rents, public services, tax rates and lot
sizes are shown in Table 7 in Appendix A.
In Configuration A all poor households live in the city where they form the majority and
vote a low public service level. Some rich households live in the suburb where they vote a high
public service level and some rich households live in the city where they benefit from the low
commuting; the rent differential balances these two forces. As the metropolitan population
increases, “new” rich households divide themselves between the city and the suburb, and x and X 
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x
(miles)
Limit 
of city
development
X
     (miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y
(miles)
Limit
 of suburb
development
Y
(miles)
Number 
of rich
households
 in city
Number of
poor
households
in city
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
Number of
poor
households
in suburb
7000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000
80 000
90 000 A 3.31 5.59 8.15 42 187 45 000 2 813
100 000 A 3.32 5.75 8.29 44 439 50 000  5 651
150 000 A 3.36 6.44 8.85 54 982 75 000 20 018
200 000 A 3.39 6.99 9.28 65 484 100 000 34 516
250 000 A 3.42 7.46 9.62 75 949 125 000 49 051
300 000 A 3.45 7.86 9.90 86 410 150 000 63 590
350 000 B 3.41 8.00 10.17 95 371 175 000 79 629
400 000 B 3.34 8.00 10.42 103 325 200 000 96 675
500 000 B 3.24 8.00 10.84 118 687 250 000 131 313
600 000 B 3.16 8.00 11.18 133 504 300 000 166 496
700 000 B 3.10 8.00 11.47 147 917 350 000 202 083
800 000 B 3.04 8.00 11.73 162 019 400 000 237 918
900 000 B 3.00 8.00 11.95 175 871 450 000 274 129
1 000 000 B 2.97 8.00 12.15 189 519 500 000 310 481
2 000 000 B 2.77 8.00 13.49 319 626 1 000 000 680 374
3 000 000 B 2.68 8.00 14.27 444 237 1 500 000 1 055 763
4 000 000 C 2.77 8.00 14.51 14.96 631 850 1 976 039 1 368 150 23 961
5 000 000 C 2.97 8.00 14.28 15.71 919 317 2 409 883 1 580 683 90 117
10 000 000 C 3.34 8.00 13.77 18.10 2 351 220 4 551 279 2 648 780 448 721
15 000 000 C 3.47 8.00 13.56 19.53 3 811 910 6 669 460 3 688 090 830 540
20 000 000 C 3.54 8.00 13.43 20.55 5 290 770 8 776 950 4 709 230 1 223 050
25 000 000 C 3.58 8.00 13.35 21.34 6 780 860 10 878 300 5 719 140 1 621 700
30 000 000 C 3.61 8.00 13.29 22.00 8 278 490 12 975 700 6 721 510 2 024 330
Table 4: equilibria with the city having a majority of poor households and with λ = .4
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move outward. At a critical population slightly above 300 000, all city land is developed and the
equilibrium configuration shifts to Configuration B.  
With Configuration B:  as the population continues to increase, some of the additional
rich households locate in the city and some locate in the suburb. In Configuration A, the
increasing population of the city was accommodated by the limit of development X moving
outwards. Now, however, the city is fully developed and hence the increasing number of poor
households pushes the class-boundary x away from the city’s jurisdictional boundary.  Parts of
the city which had been inhabited by rich households are now inhabited by poor households. The
larger rich population in the city is able to be accommodated in a smaller area because the higher
rents induce smaller land plot sizes. 
As the metropolitan population further increases, rents continue to rise in the city and at a
critical population size, which is slightly above 3 000 000 , poor households are able to achieve
the same utility at the edge of the suburb as they achieve in the city. This is Configuration C with
both income classes resident in both jurisdictions.  
Configuration C is the equilibrium which is discussed extensively in de Bartolome and
Ross (2003, 2004, 2007) where it is termed “income mixing”. As the population continues to
increase, some “new” poor households locate in the suburb, allowing the class boundary x to
move outwards.  Parts of the city which had been inhabited by poor households revert to rich
households. This is our explanation for the phenomena which is popularly termed 
“gentrification”: rents in the city are sufficiently high that some poor households locate in the
suburb, allowing rich households to live in areas of the city which had previously been inhabited
by poor households.
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As the metropolitan population increases and the equilibrium configuration changes from
Configuration A through Configuration B, the proportion of the city’s population which is poor
increases. Because the property tax is being partially used to finance the city’s public service, the
increasing proportion of poor households increases the tax-price of the public service. As shown
in Table 7, this causes the public service voted in the city to deteriorate and the city’s property
tax rate to increase.  However, the situation reverses when the configuration changes to
Configuration C. With poor households now locating in the suburb, the proportion of the city’s
population which is poor decreases, lowering the tax-price of the public service and causing the
city’s public service to “rebound” and the city’s property tax rate to decrease. 
Rents paid by rich households exceed those paid by poor households but - beyond a
metropolitan population of 400 000 - most rich households are located in the suburb where rents
are relatively low. Hence the average lot size of rich households exceeds that of poor households
until the metropolitan population exceeds 10 000 000.
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5.3  Equilibria with both jurisdictions occupied: the city having majority of rich households
           
                                       Configuration D                            Configuration E                
Figure 6: Equilibrium configurations with city having majority of rich households and λ=.4.
Section 5.2 has discussed equilibria with poor households being the majority in the city.
With both jurisdictions being occupied, there are alternative equilibria in which rich households
form the majority in the city, voting a high public service there. The equilibria are illustrated in
Figure 6 and their boundaries and populations are shown in Table 5 below. Rents, public
services, tax rates and lot sizes are shown in Table 8 in Appendix A.
Configuration D is the analogue to Configuration A. The city is inhabited by both income
classes but now rich households are the majority, and the suburb is inhabited only by poor
households. For poor households living in the suburb, the cost of the longer commute is balanced
by the benefit of being able to vote a lower public service. There is undeveloped city land.
As the metropolitan population grows, “new” poor households distribute themselves
between the city and the suburb, and the boundaries x and X move outwards until the limit of
development reaches the city’s jurisdictional boundary and Configuration E is reached.
-32-
Configuration E is the analogue of Configuration B. As the metropolitan population
continues to grow: some “new” poor households locate in the suburb but all “new” rich
households locate in the city, pushing the class boundary x outwards. The increasing population
in the city is accommodated by the smaller lot sizes induced by the increase in rents. Rich
households make up an increasing proportion of the city’s population, increasing the implicit
subsidy to each poor household; this keeps poor households in the city and this configuration is
maintained at all reasonable metropolitan populations.21 
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x
(miles)
Limit 
of  city
development
X
(miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y
     (miles)
Limit 
of suburb
development
Y
(miles)
Number 
of rich
households
in city
Number 
of poor
households
in city
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
Number 
of poor
households
in suburb
7000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000
80 000
90 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000 D 4.12 7.60 8.12 125 000 121 350 3 650
300 000 D 4.32 7.96 8.44 150 000 135 350 14 650
350 000 E 4.43 8.00 8.80 175 000 146 146 28 854
400 000 E 4.52 8.00 9.14 200 000 156 221 43 779
500 000 E 4.66 8.00 9.73 250 000 175 736 74 264
600 000 E 4.77 8.00 10.22 300 000 194 634 105 366
700 000 E 4.85 8.00 10.66 350 000 213 086 136 914
800 000 E 4.92 8.00 11.04 400 000 231 199 168 801
900 000 E 4.97 8.00 11.39 450 000 249 047 200 953
1 000 000 E 5.02 8.00 11.70 500 000 266 679 233 321
2 000 000 E 5.27 8.00 13.87 1 000 000 436 405 563 595
3 000 000 E 5.38 8.00 15.20 1 500 000 600 496 899 504
4 000 000 E 5.44 8.00 16.17 2 000 000 762 109 1 237 891
5 000 000 E 5.48 8.00 16.93 2 500 000 922 314 1 577 686
10 000 000 E 5.57 8.00 19.36 5 000 000 1 713 730 3 286 270
15 000 000 E 5.61 8.00 20.80 7 500 000 2 498 370 5 001 630
20 000 000 E 5.62 8.00 21.83 10 000 000 3 280 150 6 719 850
25 000 000 E 5.63 8.00 22.64 12 500 000 4 060 340 8 439 660
30 000 000 E 5.64 8.00 23.29 15 000 000 4 839 510 10 160 490
Table 5: equilibria with the city having a majority of rich households and with λ = .4
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5.4 Further discussion of the growth path
Tables 3 and 4 show that the “single city” continues to be the equilibrium configuration 
until slightly above 80 000 or until N = 80 016. As the metropolitan population increases beyond
N = 80 016 some rich households locate in the suburb: the equilibrium changes continuously
from the configuration of the “single city” to Configuration A ( x, X and Y change continuously
through the transition). Viewing the metropolitan area’s path as a continuous sequence of static
equilibria, rich households “jump” over undeveloped land to the suburb before poor households
“spill” into the suburb. Rich households win the race to the suburb leaving poor households in
control of the city. 
Figure 6 shows this in a different way. We continue to focus on the case with  λ = .4. The
central axis shows the metropolitan population N.  The equilibrium configuration (at each N) in
which poor households are the city’s majority is shown above the central axis, and the
equilibrium configuration in which rich households are the city’s majority is shown below the
central axis.  For example: for metropolitan populations between 80 016 and 317 579,  there is
an equilibrium with poor households being a majority in the city and it has Configuration A.
Figure 6: summary of equilibrium configurations as N changes with λ = .4
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Figure 6 shows that the “single city” is the only equilibrium configuration at small
metropolitan populations but it ceases to be an equilibrium configuration when the metropolitan
population reaches 80 016. Between populations of 80 016 and 233 245, Configuration A is the
only equilibrium and hence it is selected when the “single city” equilibrium breaks down. Our
assumption about continuity implies that, once this configuration - with the poor being the
majority in the city - has been established, it is maintained 
A configuration with rich households being the majority in the city (Configuration D)
does not exist until the metropolitan population is 233 245.  If rich households were forbidden to
locate in the suburb, the “single city” would become fully developed and poor households would
“spill” into the suburb when the metropolitan population reached 252 480. As indicated in
Section 3, as poor households spilled into the suburb, rich households would become the city’s
majority. They would vote a high public service in the city, causing additional poor households
to locate to the suburb, creating undeveloped land in the city. This would correspond to an
equilibrium with the form of Configuration D.  Hence, although Configuration D exists as a
static equilibrium configuration at populations above 233 245, even if the poor do not to “jump”
to the suburb, it cannot be reached from the “single city” until the metropolitan population
reaches 252 480. This is shown in Figure 6 by the arrow covering the populations for which
Configuration D is an equilibrium being dashed for populations between 233 245 and 252 80.
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5.5 What is causing the rich to “jump” to the suburb? The pure residence tax.
In our model, rich households “jump” to the suburb before poor households “spill” into
the suburb. The net effect of the commuting cost and inelastic land demand is to push rich
households towards the city. If jurisdictions financed their expenditures using only a residence
tax, the only force pushing rich households towards the suburb would be the fiscal force - by
moving to the suburb, a rich household can vote a higher pubic service than is provided by the
city. However, the partial use of the property tax introduces additional forces. Implicit in the
property tax is a transfer from rich to poor households. Because a rich household “jumping” to
the suburb avoids this transfer, this aspect of the property tax reinforces the force pushing the
rich household to jump.  However the property tax has another aspect which “holds the rich
household back.” Because it lowers the tax price of the public service to poor households
(relative to the pure residence tax), it raises the public service voted in the city which makes the
city more attractive to rich households and delays their “jump” to the suburb.
To determine if it is the fiscal effect per se which is causing rich households to “jump”
(and hence creating cities in which poor households congregate), we reran the simulations using
a pure residence tax or setting . The characteristics of the computed equilibria are shown in
Appendix B; the characteristics of the “single city” are shown in Table 9.With   the “single
city” ceases to be an equilibrium when  N = 44 103 and while there is undeveloped land in the
city; at this population a rich household can achieve the same utility whether he locates in the
city or in the suburb.  With the partial use of the property tax, the “single city” ceased to be an
equilibrium when N = 80 016.  Therefore the primary force causing rich households to “jump” to
the suburb is the difference in the public service levels, and the property tax, by inducing a
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higher public service level in the city, delays the “jump”.
With λ = 0 and with both jurisdictions being occupied, the equilibrium configurations in
which poor households are the majority in the city are the same configurations as were illustrated
in Figure 5; the characteristics of the equilibria at different metropolitan populations are shown
in Table 10 in Appendix B.  When the metropolitan population exceeds 44 103, the equilibrium
configuration is Configuration A, which is reached from the “single city” by a continuous
change in the boundaries x, X and Y.  
The property tax raises the after-tax rent and reduces lot sizes.  Hence removing the
property tax or setting  causes the city to fill up faster and the shift from Configuration A to
Configuration B occurs at a lower metropolitan population. In considering the shift from
Configuration B to Configuration C: as noted earlier, the property tax includes an implicit
transfer from rich households to poor households in jurisdictions in which both are present. This
makes it beneficial for poor households to locate in the suburb when it is controlled by rich
households. In consequence, removing the property tax or setting  makes the suburb less
attractive to poor households and the shift from Configuration B to Configuration C occurs at a
higher metropolitan population. With , gentrification (interpreted as x increasing as the
metropolitan population increases) occurs later. 
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              Configuration D                       Configuration F                     Configuration G
Figure 7: Equilibrium configurations with the city having a majority of rich households and λ=0.
Figure 7 shows the equilibria in which rich households are the majority in the city (and
with ); characteristics of these equilibria are shown in Table 11 in Appendix B.  The pure
residence tax avoids the transfer from rich to poor households implicit with the property tax, and
therefore reduces the incentive for poor households to locate in jurisdictions controlled by rich
households. Therefore Configuration D occurs earlier if the partial property tax is replaced with
a pure residence tax. 
With  and with Configuration D: as the metropolitan population increases, the
increasing number of rich households in the city pushes the class boundary x outwards. The
public services in each jurisdiction are unchanged. Considering poor households at X and Y: they
pay the same rent. Therefore, as the population increases, the commuting advantage of a poor
household at X relative to that of a poor household at Y must be maintained and this is achieved
by the limits of development in the city (X) and in the suburb (Y) moving outwards at the same
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rate. The bigger area traced out by the change in radius in the suburb means that some poor
households who previously lived in the city now locate in the suburb so that the number of poor
households in the city actually declines. At a critical population just less than 20 000 all poor
households live in the suburb and complete “income sorting” is achieved while there is still
undeveloped city land. This configuration is denoted Configuration F. 
With Configuration F (and λ = 0): as the metropolitan population increases, the “new”
rich households locate in the city and the limit of development in the city continues to move
outwards. At a metropolitan population just above 800 000, all land in the city is developed. This
configuration is denoted Configuration G.
Figure 8 repeats the analysis of Figure 7 but with λ = 0. 
Figure 7: summary of equilibrium configurations as N changes with λ = 0
Figure 8 shows that, at metropolitan populations for which the “single city” is an equilibrium
configuration, there are also equilibria with Configurations D and F (the rich being the majority
in the city). However, these latter configurations require that some poor households locate in the
suburb - a location choice which, with undeveloped city land, would be unfavorable to them. Put
differently, the incentives faced by poor households prevent Configurations D and E being
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reached from the “single city” configuration with undeveloped land. The “single city” ceases to
be an equilibrium before poor households spill into the suburb (if rich households were
forbidden to jump to the suburb, this would occur at N = 403 934).
5.6.  and robustness
Similar results are obtained with although the details differ. In particular the full use
of the property tax causes the public service voted by poor households in the “single city” to rise
and delays the “jump” of rich households to the suburb: this now occurs when N = 132 730.
When the “jump” occurs there is still undeveloped city land.22 With the public service being fully
financed by the property tax, the incentive for a poor household to live in a jurisdiction
containing rich households is increased: as rich households “jump”, poor households “follow”: 
x, X, and Y change discontinuously.  Hence the configurations of the subsequent equilibria differ
from those illustrated in Figure 5. 
In our framework, if x, X and Y change discontinuously, any configuration which is an
equilibrium configuration can potentially be selected. However, with , at N= 132 730, the
only equilibrium with both jurisdictions occupied has only poor households living in the city,
and rich and poor households living in the suburb. A configuration with rich households living in
the city does not become a equilibrium until N = 4 332 279.23 Therefore, with , when the
“single city” ceases to be an equilibrium, the configuration in which poor households are the
majority in the city is selected; all rich households locate in the suburb and there is undeveloped
city land. As the population increases, further changes are continuous. At a population of N = 3
503 550  the city becomes fully developed: the configuration continues to have only poor
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households living in the city, and rich and poor households living in the suburb. 
The above discussion has considered variation in the tax parameter λ. Our main result -
that rich households “jump into” the suburb before poor households “spill into” the suburb - is
robust if each of the other parameter values is changed by  ± 20%. However, the analysis on
gentrification is less robust because, when some parameter values change by ± 20%, 
Configuration C ceases to be an equilibrium configuration. 
6.  CONCLUSION
In a monocentric urban model with two jurisdictions - an inner city and a surrounding
suburb - there tend to be two equilibria: one in which poor households are the inner city's
majority and one in which rich households are the inner city's majority. Our simulation suggests
that the growth path of the metropolitan area selects the equilibrium in which poor households
are the inner city’s majority because rich households migrate to form a new jurisdiction in the
suburb while there is still undeveloped land in the city. At large metropolitan populations, the
equilibrium has both income classes living in both jurisdictions;  further population growth
causes gentrification as some rich households locate in areas in the city which were previously
inhabited by poor households. 
Our model has focused on the U.S. experience. In doing so, we have assumed that
separate jurisdictions have considerable autonomy, leading to considerable variation in the
public service level across jurisdictions. The equilibrium in which rich households congregate in
the suburb is selected because of their high willingness to pay for their preferred public service.
Breuckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) note that many European cities have higher average income
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in the inner city than in the suburbs. We believe that an important difference between the U.S.
and Europe is that in Europe there is less variation in the public service level across jurisdictions
and less reliance on the property tax.24 In our model, if a regional government is introduced
which prevents large differences in the public service being established between jurisdictions,
rich households have a smaller incentive to “jump” over undeveloped city land to form a new
jurisdiction in the suburb. If the allowed difference is sufficiently small, the equilibrium growth
path may have poor households “spilling” into the suburb and rich households forming the inner
city’s majority.  Thus it seems that, by adding a regional government to our model and imbuing
it with different powers or roles, we might be able to explain the difference between the U.S. and
the European experiences.  This is an issue we intend to explore in future research. 
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APPENDIX A: ADDITIONAL JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTERISTICS WITH 
Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
rent at
city’s
center
r(0)
($/acre)
rent at
city side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B-)
($/acre)
rent at
suburb side
of
jurisdiction
coundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax
rate
ts
Average
lot size
of poor
households
(acres)
Average 
lot size
 of rich
households
(acres)
7 000 single city 5 054 1.65 0.17 0.46 0.50
10 000 single city 5 864 1.65 0.17 0.45 0.46
20 000 single city 8 253 1.65 0.17 0.43 0.38
40 000 single city 12 482  1.65 0.17 0.41 0.30
80 000 single city 20 225 1.65 0.17 0.37 0.22
Table 6: rents, public service levels, tax rates and lot sizes of “single city” with 
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Rent at
city’s
center
r(0)
($/acre)
Rent at 
city side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B-)
($/acre)
Rent at
suburb side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service
 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax
rate
ts
Average
lot size
of poor
households
(acres)
Average 
lot size of
rich
households
(acres)
7 000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000
80 000
90 000 A 21 226 2 166 1.65 0.17 3.17 0.22 0.36 0.24
100 000 A 22 213 2 330 1.64 0.18 3.17 0.22 0.36 0.25
150 000 A 27 013 3 135 1.63 0.18 3.17 0.22 0.32 0.28
200 000 A 31 682 3 918 1.63 0.19 3.17 0.22 0.30 0.27
250 000 A 36 279 4 685 1.62 0.20 3.17 0.22 0.28 0.26
300 000 A 40 832 5 441 1.62 0.20 3.17 0.22 0.27 0.25
350 000 B 45 487 2 172 6 267 1.61 0.20 3.17 0.22 0.24 0.23
400 000 B 50 144 2 436 7 136 1.61 0.20 3.17 0.22 0.21 0.22
500 000 B 59 268 2 956 8 885 1.61 0.21 3.17 0.22 0.17 0.21
600 000 B 68 202 3 471 10 646 1.60 0.21 3.17 0.22 0.14 0.19
700 000 B 76 995 3 981 12 416 1.60 0.22 3.17 0.22 0.13 0.18
800 000 B 85 678 4 488 14 193 1.60 0.22 3.17 0.22 0.11 0.17
900 000 B 94 275 4 992 15 977 1.59 0.22 3.17 0.22 0.10 0.16
1 000 000 B 102 800 5 494 17 765 1.59 0.22 3.17 0.22 0.09 0.15
2 000 000 B 185 812 10 441 35 817 1.58 0.23 3.17 0.22 0.06 0.10
3 000 000 B 266 893 15 328 54 021 1.58 0.24 3.17 0.22 0.03 0.08
4 000 000 C 367 259 20 635 69 375 1.58 0.23 3.16 0.23 0.03 0.06
5 000 000 C 497 418 26 532 80 292 1.59 0.22 3.14 0.23 0.03 0.05
10 000 000 C 1 141 070 55 425 135 157 1.61 0.20 3.10 0.25 0.03 0.02
15 000 000 C 1 790 950 84 231 188 678 1.62 0.20 3.08 0.26 0.03 0.01
20 000 000 C 2 445 470 113 057 241 352 1.62 0.20 3.07 0.26 0.02 0.01
25 000 000 C 3 102 930 141 905 293 503 1.62 0.19 3.06 0.26 0.02 0.01
30 000 000 C 3 762 410 170 769 345 302 1.62 0.19 3.05 0.27 0.02 0.01
Table 7: equilibria with the city having a majority of poor households and with λ = .4
-45-
Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Rent at
city’s
center
r(0)
($/acre)
Rent at
city side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B-)
($/acre)
Rent at
suburb side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax
rate
ts
Average
lot size
of poor
households
(acres)
Average 
lot size of
rich
households
(acres)
7 000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000
80 000
90 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000 D 44 984 2 064 2.89 0.34 1.47 0.37 0.27 0.11
300 000 D 52 160 2 253 2.90 0.33 1.47 0.37 0.28 0.10
350 000 E 59 890 2 205 2 489 2.91 0.32 1.47 0.37 0.27 0.09
400 000 E 67 679 2 437 2 728 2.93 0.32 1.47 0.37 0.25 0.08
500 000 E 83 193 2 891 3 200 2.94 0.31 1.47 0.37 0.23 0.07
600 000 E 98 645 3 338 3 663 2.96 0.31 1.47 0.37 0.22 0.06
700 000 E 114 053 3 779 4121 2.97 0.30 1.47 0.37 0.21 0.05
800 000 E 129 427 4 216 4 575 2.97 0.30 1.47 0.37 0.20 0.05
900 000 E 144 775 4 649 5 025 2.98 0.30 1.47 0.37 0.19 0.04
1 000 000 E 160 101 5 079 5 473 2.99 0.29 1.47 0.37 0.18 0.04
2 000 000 E 312 714 9 298 9 863 3.01 0.28 1.47 0.37 0.13 0.02
3 000 000 E 464 781 13 448 14 179 3.02 0.28 1.47 0.37 0.11 0.02
4 000 000 E 616 613 17 567 18 463 3.03 0.28 1.47 0.37 0.09 0.01
5 000 000 E 768 314 21 670 22 729 3.03 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.08 0.01
10 000 000 E 1 525 940 42 073 43 935 3.04 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.06 0.005
15 000 000 E 2 282 950 62 400 65 056 3.04 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.04 0.003
20 000 000 E 3 039 700 82 696 86 141 3.05 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.04 0.003
25 000 000 E 3 796 320 102 974 107 207 3.05 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.03 0.002
30 000 000 E 4 552 850 123 242 128 260 3.05 0.27 1.47 0.37 0.03 0.002
Table 8: equilibria with the city having a majority of rich households and with λ = .4 (cont)
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APPENDIX B: RESULTS WITH USE OF RESIDENCE TAX ONLY  (λ = 0)
Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x (miles)
Limit 
of city
development
X (miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y (miles)
Limit 
of suburb
development
Y (miles)
Number 
of rich
households
in city
 (n2c)
Number 
of poor
households
in city
(n1c)
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
 (n2s)
Number 
of poor
households
in suburb
(n1s)
7000 single city 1.56 2.18 3 500 3 500
10 000 single city 1.79 2.54 5 000 5 000
20 000 single city 2.30 3.39 10 000 10 000
40 000 single city 2.86 4.45 20 000 20 000
Metropolitan
Population 
 
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Rent at 
city’s 
center
r(0)
($/acre)
Rent at
city side 
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B-)
($/acre)
Rent at
suburb side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax
rate
ts
Average
lot size of 
poor
households
    (acres)
Average 
lot size of
rich
households
   (acres)
7 000 single city 5 383 1.47 0.53 0.56
10 000 single city 6 296 1.47 0.52 0.52
20 000 single city 9 006 1.47 0.50 0.42
40 000 single city 13 841  1.47 0.47 0.33
Table 9: equilibria of the “single city” with λ = 0
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Metropolitan
 Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x
 (miles)
Limit 
of  city
development
X 
(miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y 
(miles)
Limit 
of suburb
development
Y 
(miles)
Number 
of rich
households
in city
 
Number 
of poor
households
in city
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
 
Number 
of poor
households
in suburb
7000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000 A 2.97 4.78 8.10 23 495 25 000 1 505
80 000 A 3.08 5.51 8.53 30 812 40 000 9 187
90 000 A 3.12 5.71 8.66 33 244 45 000 11 756
100 000 A 3.15 5.90 8.77 35 674 50 000 14 326
150 000 A 3.28 6.71 9.25 47 792 75 000 27 208
200 000 A 3.37 7.34 9.62 59 878 100 000 40 122
250 000 A 3.45 7.86 9.93 71 944 125 000 53 056
300 000 B 3.43 8.00 10.21 82 942 150 000 67 058
350 000 B 3.38 8.00 10.46 93 454 175 000 81546
400 000 B 3.35 8.00 10.68 103 912 200 000 96 088
500 000 B 3.30 8.00 11.06 124 710 250 000 125 290
600 000 B 3.26 8.00 11.37 145 394 300 000 154 606
700 000 B 3.24 8.00 11.64 165 996 350 000 184 004
800 000 B 3.21 8.00 11.87 186 538 400 000 213 462
900 000 B 3.20 8.00 12.08 207 033 450 000 242 967
1 000 000 B 3.18 8.00 12.27 227 489 500 000 272 511
2 000 000 B 3.12 8.00 13.53 430 927 1 000 000 569 073
3 000 000 B 3.09 8.00 14.28 633 433 1 500 000 866 567
4 000 000 B 3.08 8.00 14.81 835 547 2 000 000 1 164 453
5 000 000 B 3.07 8.00 15.23 1 037 440 2 500 000 1 462 560
10 000 000 B 3.06 8.00 16.53 2 045 480 5 000 000 2 954 520
15 000 000 B 3.05 8.00 17.30 3 052 530 7 500 000 4 447 470
20 000 000 B 3.04 8.00 17.84 4 059 170 10 000 000 5 940 830
25 000 000 C 3.05 8.00 17.99 18.51 5 074 680 12 471 404 7 425 320 28 596
30 000 000 C 3.06 8.00 18.00 19.18 6 094 770 14 927 621 8 905 230 72 379
Table 10(a): equilibria with the city having a majority of poor households and with λ = 0
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Rent at 
city’s
center
r(0)
($/acre)
Rent at 
city side 
of
jurisdiction
boundary
     r(B-)
  ($/acre)
Rent at
suburb side
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax rate
ts
Average
lot size
of poor
households
(acres)
Average 
lot size 
of rich
households
(acres)
7 000
10 000
20 000
40 000
50 000 A 15 593 2 109 1.47 3.17 0.45 0.36
80 000 A 19 584 2 649 1.47 3.17 0.42 0.37
90 000 A 20 884 2 825 1.47 3.17 0.41 0.37
100 000 A 22 172 2 999 1.47 3.17 0.40 0.37
150 000 A 28 491 3 853 1.47 3.17 0.37 0.35
200 000 A 34 669 4 689 1.47 3.17 0.34 0.32
250 000 A 40 757 5 513 1.47 3.17 0.32 0.30
300 000 B 47 272 2 247 6 394 1.47 3.17 0.28 0.28
350 000 B 53 953 2 593 7 297 1.47 3.17 0.24 0.26
400 000 B 60 612 2 939 8 198 1.47 3.17 0.21 0.25
500 000 B 73 884 3 629 9 993 1.47 3.17 0.17 0.22
600 000 B 87 110 4 317 11 782 1.47 3.17 0.14 0.20
700 000 B 100 305 5 005 13 567 1.47 3.17 0.12 0.18
800 000 B 113 476 5 692 15 348 1.47 3.17 0.11 0.18
900 000 B 126 629 6 378 17 127 1.47 3.17 0.10 0.16
1 000 000 B 139 767 7 065 18 904 1.47 3.17 0.09 0.16
2 000 000 B 270 713 13 915 36 614 1.47 3.17 0.04 0.10
3 000 000 B 401 305 20 756 54 278 1.47 3.17 0.03 0.08
4 000 000 B 531 749 27 593 71 921 1.47 3.17 0.03 0.07
5 000 000 B 662 111 34 429 89 553 1.47 3.17 0.02 0.06
10 000 000 B 1 313 380 68 591 177 639 1.47 3.17 0.01 0.04
15 000 000 B 1 964 280 102 744 265 675 1.47 3.17 0.01 0.03
20 000 000 B 2 615 030 136 894 353 691 1.47 3.17 0.004 0.02
25 000 000 C 3 265 860 170 838 441 718 1.47 3.17 0.005 0.02
30 000 000 C 3 916 680 204 671 529 744 1.47 3.17 0.005 0.01
Table 10(b): equilibria with the city having a majority of poor households and with λ = 0 (cont)
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Metropolita
n
Population  
N         
Configuration Boundary
between rich
and poor 
in city, 
x
(miles)
Limit of 
city
development
X
(miles)
Boundary
between rich
and poor in
suburb 
y
(miles)
Limit of
suburb
development
Y
(miles)
Number 
of rich
households
in city
Number of
poor
households
in city
Number 
of rich
households
in suburb
Number of
poor
households
in suburb
7000 D 1.57 2.17 8.01 3 500 3 416 84
10 000 D 1.86 2.27 8.11 5 000 2 511 2 489
20 000 F 2.53 8.41 10 000 10 000
40 000 F 3.35 8.77 20 000 20 000
50 000 F 3.63 8.93 25 000 25 000
80 000 F 4.25 9.37 40 000 40 000
90 000 F 4.42 9.50 45 000 45 000
100 000 F 4.57 9.62 50 000 50 000
150 000 F 5.18 10.18 75 000 75 000
200 000 F 5.62 10.66 100 000 100 000
250 000 F 5.99 11.07 125 000 125 000
300 000 F 6.29 11.43 150 000 150 000
350 000 F 6.55 11.76 175 000 175 000
400 000 F 6.77 12.05 200 000 200 000
500 000 F 7.16 12.58 250 000 250 000
600 000 F 7.47 13.03 300 000 300 000
700 000 F 7.74 13.42 350 000 350 000
800 000 F 7.98 13.78 400 000 400 000
900 000 G 8.00 14.11 450 000 450 000
1 000 000 G 8.00 14.40 500 000 500 000
2 000 000 G 8.00 16.48 1 000 000 1 000 000
3 000 000 G 8.00 17.78 1 500 000 1 500 000
4 000 000 G 8.00 18.74 2 000 000 2 000 000
5 000 000 G 8.00 19.49 2 500 000 2 500 000
10 000 000 G 8.00 21.89 5 000 000 5 000 000
15 000 000 G 8.00 23.33 7 500 000 7 500 000
20 000 000 G 8.00 24.36 10 000 000 10 000 000
25 000 000 G 8.00 25.16 12 500 000 12 500 000
30 000 000 G 8.00 25.82 15 000 000 15 000 000
Table11(a): equilibria when the city having a majority of rich households and  λ = 0
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Metropolitan
Population  
N         
Equilibrium
Configuration
Rent at
city’s
center
r(0)
($/acre)
Rent at 
city side 
of
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B-)
($/acre)
Rent at
suburb side
of 
jurisdiction
boundary
r(B+)
($/acre)
City 
public
service 
gc
City
property
tax rate
tc
Suburb
public
service
gs
Suburb
property
tax
rate
ts
Average
lot size
of poor
households
(acres)
Average 
lot size of
rich
households
(acres)
7 000 D 5 371 2 002 3.17 1.47 0.53 0.56
10 000 D 5 961 2 060 3.17 1.47 0.55 0.56
20 000 F 7 783 2 237 3.17 1.47 0.54 0.54
40 000 F 11 656 2 464 3.17 1.47 0.52 0.45
50 000 F 13 479 2 575 3.17 1.47 0.51 0.42
80 000 F 18 736 2 899 3.17 1.47 0.48 0.36
90 000 F 20 443 3 005 3.17 1.47 0.47 0.35
100 000 F 22 134 3 110 3.17 1.47 0.46 0.34
150 000 F 30 434 3 622 3.17 1.47 0.43 0.29
200 000 F 38 571 4 119 3.17 1.47 0.40 0.25
250 000 F 46 613 4 605 3.17 1.47 0.38 0.23
300 000 F 54 593 5 083 3.17 1.47 0.36 0.21
350 000 F 62 527 5 555 3.17 1.47 0.34 0.20
400 000 F 70 428 6 022 3.17 1.47 0.33 0.18
500 000 F 86 158 6 944 3.17 1.47 0.30 0.16
600000 F 101 818 7 853 3.17 1.47 0.28 0.15
700 000 F 117 430 8 753 3.17 1.47 0.27 0.14
800 000 F 133 005 9 647 3.17 1.47 0.25 0.13
900 000 G 149 528 2 226 10 534 3.17 1.47 0.24 0.11
1 000 000 G 166 142 2 473 11 417 3.17 1.47 0.23 0.10
2 000 000 G 332 284 4 946 20 092 3.17 1.47 0.17 0.05
3 000 000 G 498 426 7 420 28 635 3.17 1.47 0.14 0.03
4 000 000 G 664 568 9 893 37 118 3.17 1.47 0.12 0.03
5 000 000 G 830 170 12 366 45 567 3.17 1.47 0.10 0.02
10 000 000 G 1 661 420 24 732 87 578 3.17 1.47 0.07 0.01
15 000 000 G 2 492 130 37 098 129 422 3.17 1.47 0.05 0.007
20 000 000 G 3 322 840 49 464 171 197 3.17 1.47 0.04 0.005
25 000 000 G 4 153 550 61 830 212 934 3.17 1.47 0.04 0.004
30 000 000 G 4 984 260 74 196 254 645 3.17 1.47 .03 .003
Table 11(b): equilibria with the city having a majority of rich households and  λ = 0 (cont.)
-51-
REFERENCES
Alonso, W., (1964),  Location and land use: toward a general theory of land rent. Cambridge:
Harvard University Press.
Arnott, R. J. and F. D. Lewis, (1979),  “The transition to urban land use,” Journal of Political
Economy 87, 161-170.
Berglas, E., (1976a),  “On the theory of clubs,” Papers and Proceedings of the American
Economic Association 66, 116-121.
Berglas, E., (1976b), “Distribution of tastes and skills, and the provision of local public goods,”
Journal of Public Economics 6, 406-423.
Brueckner, J.K., and S.S. Rosenthal, (2006), “Gentrification and Neighborhood Housing Cycles:
Will America’s future downtowns be rich?”, mimeo.
Brueckner, J.K., J-F Thisse, and Y. Zenou, (1999), “Why is central Paris rich and downtown
Detroit poor? An amenity based theory,” European Economic Review 43, 91-107.
Cappoza, D. and R. W. Helsley, (1989),  “The fundamentals of land prices and urban growth,”
Journal of Urban Economics 26, 295-306.
Cheshire, P., and S. Sheppard, (1998), “Estimating the demand for housing, land and
neighbourhood characteristics,” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics 60, 357-377.
de Bartolome, C.A.M., and S.L. Ross, (2003), “Equilibrium with local governments and
commuting: income sorting and income mixing,” Journal of Urban Economics 54, 1-
20.de Bartolome and Ross 2004
de Bartolome, C.A.M, and S.L. Ross, (2004), “Who’s in charge of the central city? The conflict
between efficiency and equity in the design of a metropolitan area,” Journal of Urban
-52-
Economics 56, 458-483.
de Bartolome, C.A.M. and S.L. Ross, (2007), “Community income distributions in a
metropolitan area,” forthcoming in Journal of Urban Economics.
Duncombe, W.D.,  (1991), “Demand for local public services revisted: the case of fire
protection,” Public Finance Quarterly 19 , 412-436
Dynarski, M., R. Schwab and E. Zampelli, (1989), “Local characteristics and public production:
the case of education,” Journal of Urban Economics 26 250-263.
Elickson, B., (1971), “Jurisdictional fragmentation and residential choice,” Papers and
Proceedings of the American Economic Association 61, 334-339.
Epple, D., and G.J. Platt, (1998), Equilibrium and local redistribution in an urban economy when
households differ in both preferences and income,” Journal of Urban Economics, 43, 23-
51.
Epple, D., R. Filimon and T. Romer, (1984), “Equilibrium among local jurisdictions: toward an
integrated treatment of voting and residential choice,” Journal of Public Economics 24,
281-308.
Epple, D., R. Filimon and T. Romer, (1993), "Existence of voting and housing equilibrium in a
system of communities with property taxes," Regional Science and Urban Economics 23,
585-610.
Glaeser, E.L., J. Gyourko and R. Saks, (2005), “Why is Manhatten so expensive? Regulation and
the rise in housing prices,” Journal of Law and Economics 48, 331-369.
Glaeser, E.L., M.E. Kahn and J. Rappaport, (2000), “Why do the poor live in the cities?”
National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper # 7636.
-53-
Gyourko, J., and R. Voith, (2001), “The price elasticity of the demand for residential land:
estimation and some implications for urban form,” Working Paper of the Real Estate
Department at Wharton.
Inman, R.P., (1979), “The fiscal performance of local governments: an interpretive review,” in
Current Issues in Urban Economics (P. Miezkowski and M. Straszheim , eds.).
Maltimore, MD: John Hopkins University Press.
King, A.T., (1976), “The demand for housing: a Lancastrian approach,”Southern Economics
Journal , 43, 1077-1087.
LeRoy, S.F., and J. Sonstelie, (1983), “Paradise lost and regained: transportation, innovation,
income and residential location,” Journal of Urban Economics 13, 67-89.
McGuire, M.C., (1974), “Group segregation and optimal jurisdictions,” Journal of Political
Economy 82 ,112-132.
McMillan, M.L., (1979), “Estimates of households’ preferences for environmental quality and
other housing characteristics from a system of demand equations,” Scandinavian Journal
of Economics, 81, 174-187.
Mills, E.S., (1967). “An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area,.”
Papers and Proceedings of the American Economic Association 57, 197-210.
Muth, R., (1961), “The spatial structure of the housing market,” Papers and Proceedings of the
Regional Science Association 7, 207-220.
Muth, R., (1969), Cities and Housing. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Muth, R.,  (1971), “The derived demand for urban residential land,” Urban Studies 8, 243-254
Ross, S.L., and J. Yinger, (1999), “Sorting and voting: a review of the literature on urban public
-54-
finance,” in The Handbook of Urban and Regional Economics, Vol 3: Applied Urban
Economics (P. Cheshire and E.S. Mills, eds.). Amsterdam: North Holland.
Schwab, R.M.  and E.M. Zampelli, (1987), “Disentangling the demand function from the
production function for local public services,” Journal of Public Economics 33, 245-260.
Straszheim, M.R., (1975), An econometric analysis of the urban housing market. New York,
NY: National Bureau of Economic Research. 
Tiebout, C.M., (1956), “A pure theory of local expenditures,” Journal of Political Economy 94,
416-424.
Wheaton, W., (1977), “Income and urban residence: An analysis of consumer demand for
location,” American Economic Review 67, 620-631.
Wheaton, W., (1982), “Urban residential growth under perfect foresight,” Journal of Urban
Economics 12, 1-12.
Wooders, M., (1978), “Equilibria, the core and jurisdictional structures in economies with a local
public good,” Journal of Economic Theory 18, 328-348.
Yinger, J., (1982), “Capitalization and the theory of local public finance,” Journal of Political
Economy 90, 917-943.
-55-
1.  Ross and Yinger (1999) survey this literature.
2.   In addition to considering the property tax, the model presented in this paper extends the
earlier models by making house size endogenous. 
3.  We want to stress that, because each household’s endowed income M is exogenous, its taste
parameters  and  are exogenous.
The reader should note that all households with the same endowed income have the same utility
function so that “income-mixing” arises because of differences in tastes between income-classes
and not because of differences in tastes between and among income classes (as in Epple and Platt
(1998)).
4.  For ease of calculation, the jurisdiction is assumed to provide a public service and not a
public good. It is straightforward to change the publically-provided good from a public service to
a public good.
5.  Wheaton (1977) shows that, in the Alonso-Mills-Muth model, the bid-rent curve steepens
with income if the income elasticity of land is less than the income elasticity of commuting cost.
In our model the income elasticity of commuting cost is unity.
6.  For diagrammatic clarity, the bid-rent schedules and the rent schedule are drawn as straight
lines. In fact, as the location moves towards the city’s center, the higher rents cause lot sizes to
fall; this causes the bid-rent curves and the rent schedule steepen.
7.  If only one income class resides in the jurisdiction, the bid-rent curve of the other income
class lies below the bid-rent curve of the income class which resides in the jurisdiction.
8.  In practice, if the incentive existed, a developer might build a development with houses
targeted for households with his income so that he would move into the jurisdiction in the
company of others with his income.
9.  The assumption of myopia greatly simplifies the model but we do not believe any results
depend on it. What is important is that the public service differs in the two jurisdictions. A
similar assumption was made by Epple et al. (1984, 1993).
10.  An algebraic formulation of the model is available from the authors on request.
11.  Because utility is additively separable and linear in the numeraire, our results are unchanged
if all rents are paid to absentee landlords.
12.  As noted in Footnote 6, for diagrammatic clarity, the rent schedules are drawn as straight
lines. In fact, as the location moves away from the metropolitan center, the slope of the rent
schedule decreases.
ENDNOTES
-56-
13.  Strictly, as the metropolitan population increases from N to N + ΔN  provided there is a strict
majority of one class in the suburb in the pre-existing equilibrium (at population N), this majority
is maintained in the adjacent equilibrium at population (N + ΔN).  
14.  Although the causation is quite different, this result resembles the leapfrog development
pattern that may appear in models of urban growth where some land is left vacant in the interior
because its option value for future development exceeds its value in current use. For some
examples in the literature, see Arnott and Lewis (1979), Capozza and Helsley (1989) and
Wheaton (1982).
15.  With equal numbers of poor and rich households, the rich become the majority in the city
immediately the poor spill over into the suburb.
16.  Our continuity argument is strong in that it claims x, X , y and Y change continuously. A
weaker argument is that, once a class establishes a majority in a jurisdiction, this majority is
maintained provided that there is a (static) equilibrium with this majority.
17.  The linear dependence on the numeraire implies that a household’s desired level of the
public service does not depend on his location. The logarithmic dependance of land implies that
the rent schedule is relatively easy to calculate. The logarithmic dependance of housing capital
implies that it is possible to obtain a closed-form solution for the tax rate. In addition, the linear
and separable dependence on the numeraire implies that the rent returned does not affect the
choice of l, h or g. 
18.  Our calibration assumes that there is a single city, that the public service is financed by a
residence tax and that the public service is determined by rich or poor households with equal
probability.
19.  A list of all such possible equilibria is available from the authors on request.
20.  The high price elasticity of land demand (relative to income elasticity) leads the average plot
size of the rich to be less than that of the poor at metropolitan populations above 10 000
households. 
21.  We have simulated up to a metropolitan population of 100 million households.
22.  If rich households in the “single city” were prevented from locating in the suburb, the city
would become fully developed and poor households would spill into the suburb when N= 403
934.
23.  The equilibrium has the form of Configuration E.
24.  Brueckner, Thisse and Zenou (1999) attribute the European pattern to the large historical
amenities present in many European cities (but absent from most U.S. cities).

